On the Seriousness of Mistakes

by: Isaac Levi

Philosophy of Science, Vol. 29, No. 1. (1962), pp. 47-65.

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摘要

Several authors have recently contended that modern statistical theory provides a powerful argument in favor of the view that if scientists accept or reject hypotheses at all they do so only in a behavioral sense--i.e., in a sense which reduces "accepting P" to "acting on the basis of P relative to an objective O". In this paper, the argument from statistics in favor of a behavioral view is outlined; an interpretation of two statistical procedures (Bayes method and signifigance testing) is offered which does not entail a behavioral analysis of "accepting a hypothesis"; and the conclusion that non-behavioral analyses of belief are compatible with the application of current statistical theory in the sciences is tentatively advanced.

@article{citeulike:1815100, abstract = {Several authors have recently contended that modern statistical theory provides a powerful argument in favor of the view that if scientists accept or reject hypotheses at all they do so only in a behavioral sense--i.e., in a sense which reduces \"accepting P\" to \"acting on the basis of P relative to an objective O\". In this paper, the argument from statistics in favor of a behavioral view is outlined; an interpretation of two statistical procedures (Bayes method and signifigance testing) is offered which does not entail a behavioral analysis of \"accepting a hypothesis\"; and the conclusion that non-behavioral analyses of belief are compatible with the application of current statistical theory in the sciences is tentatively advanced.}, author = {Levi, Isaac }, citeulike-article-id = {1815100}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, keywords = {error, false\_positivefalse\_negative}, number = {1}, pages = {47--65}, posted-at = {2007-10-24 12:29:51}, priority = {3}, title = {On the Seriousness of Mistakes}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/185176}, volume = {29}, year = {1962} }

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TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:1815100 L3 - citeulike-article-id:1815100 N2 - Several authors have recently contended that modern statistical theory provides a powerful argument in favor of the view that if scientists accept or reject hypotheses at all they do so only in a behavioral sense--i.e., in a sense which reduces "accepting P" to "acting on the basis of P relative to an objective O". In this paper, the argument from statistics in favor of a behavioral view is outlined; an interpretation of two statistical procedures (Bayes method and signifigance testing) is offered which does not entail a behavioral analysis of "accepting a hypothesis"; and the conclusion that non-behavioral analyses of belief are compatible with the application of current statistical theory in the sciences is tentatively advanced. IS - 1 JF - Philosophy of Science EP - 65 TI - On the Seriousness of Mistakes VL - 29 SP - 47 KW - error KW - false_positivefalse_negative AU - Levi, Isaac PY - 1962/// UR - http://www.jstor.org/stable/185176 ER -

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